Author(s):
Dr. Karl DeRouen (University of Alabama) and Dr. Marie Olson Lounsbery (East Carolina University)
Published: 11/07/2023
Journal Title:
International Peacekeeping, Volume 31(2): 235-259
Abstract:
Civil wars are complex in ways that challenge effective resolution. Civil war actors tend to be dynamic in nature and often splinter then coalesce over time potentially evolving into multiple dyads pitted against their government. Previous work has demonstrated that when multiple rebel factions emerge, civil wars tend to be longer in duration as satisfying multiple factions tends to be more challenging. However, governments may choose to pursue dyadic agreements hoping to end the conflict either through subsequent dyadic negotiations or through more targeted military tactics focusing intently on the remaining faction(s). This study suggests that which dyads will be excluded from the peace is predictable, but also seeks to better understand what happens to those excluded factions that hedge their bets to continue the fight. Propositions are tested on all civil war peace agreements between 1945-2013. Key findings indicate the importance of political power-sharing provision and third-party assistance in bringing excluded groups into the fold.